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1. INTRODUCTION 
Modern macroeconomics literature emphasises both the short run and long run 
objectives of fiscal policy [Romer (2006)]. In the short run it can be used to counter 
output cyclicality and/or stabilise volatility in macro variables, which is descriptively 
same as of effects of the short run monetary policy. Further for the long-run, fiscal 
policy can also affect both the demand and supply side of the economy. But in most 
traditional analyses it is assumed that fiscal policy would adjust to ensure the inter-
temporal budget constraint to be satisfied, while monetary policy is free to adjust its 
instruments [‘Ricardian Regime’ by Sargent (1982)] such as stock of money supply 
or the nominal interest rate [Walsh (2003)]. The debt financing methods, expenditure 
and tax powers of fiscal authorities i.e. the fiscal policy has also been seen as to 
affect both the supply and demand side of the economy. As noted by Baxter and King 
(1993), the initial Real Business Cycle models had only the supply side effects of the 
fiscal policy, where these were transmitted through the wealth effect and labour-
leisure choices of the household. Recently also New-Keynesian type models with 
micro-foundations and sticky prices argue that still through the supply side fiscal 
policy management could be accorded for stabilisation [Linnemann and Schabert 
(2003)]. The demand side effects of the fiscal policy could also be found only with 
more imperfections such as ‘Rule of Thumb’ consumers or those with liquidity 
constraints, which lead to exclusion of Ricardian equivalence [Gali, et al. (2005)].  
But all that depends on the structure of the economy, as Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 
stated: 
“The evidence from large-scale econometric models has been largely dismissed on 
the grounds that, because of their Keynesian structure, these models assume rather then 
document a positive effect of positive fiscal expansion on output”.  
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In order to gauge the effects of shocks in fiscal policy or its responsiveness to 
various macro variables (i.e. the automatic stabilisers property of fiscal instruments) one 
has to see the stance by composition of budget from both the share of components and 
their classifications. Normally macroeconomics ‘fiscal stance’ is assessed by looking at 
the consolidated scale of public deficit. But the dynamic effects of the shocks in 
government spending, taxes and the consolidated budget deficit (thereby implying the 
composition of inter-temporal budget constraint) can be altogether different in magnitude 
and lags in implementation. For example, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) noted, there is 
persistent affect of government spending on private consumption, which is consistent 
with the Keynesian models but opposite in the neoclassical approach. Further, there is 
new literature on the theory of ‘expansionary fiscal contraction’, in which the reduction 
in provision of those public goods which are in the utility function of households (by 
virtue of reduction in government expenditures) leads to increased spending by 
households to meet that gap and thus components of aggregate demand increases.  
On the other hand, government expenditures (GE) can be of permanent and 
transitory nature. Both have different direct multiplier (Keynesian) affects towards 
aggregate demand (AD) components, e.g. C & I. For instance it could lead to increased 
AD directly in a standard IS-LM framework, hence activating the idle production factors 
in the economy and creating more employment and output growth. Moreover in 
recessionary phases, when economy is in a liquidity trap (e.g. Japan), where private 
investment demand becomes inelastic, fiscal policy (FP) can provide the necessary 
stimulus to the economy for coming out of that trap.1  Further, in developing economies, 
GE also plays a complimentary role for private investment. 
On the financing side of GE such as tax, or inflation-seigniorage (money printing) 
have different implications. Where as creating a debt against the same would have yet 
another set of dynamic affects on the macroeconomic variables. In case of money 
printing (fiscal dominance) there are changes in price levels, hence controlling them by 
monetary policy (MP) alone could be miss-targeted. If the increased GE is supported by 
deficit which is financed by issuing bonds through banking system, then it could lead to a 
crowding out of private investment if the interest rate rises in the loan able funds market. 
Where as in presence of a lose MP (passive FP) the interest rate would decrease and 
output increase. So domestic debt raising cost would decline, but if this is done through 
increase in Money supply (MS), exchange rate would appreciate and there could be 
indirect impact on the foreign debt servicing of the country. 
On the other hand a Fiscal Policy (FP) stance through the tax structure can affect 
the supply side of the economy by affecting the household labour supply decisions or the 
firm’s business financing decisions etc. Direct and Indirect tax levels have different 
transmission mechanism on economic agent’s decision makings. For instance as taxes 
would change the disposable incomes of household hence affecting the household’s 
consumption, investment, labour supply and savings decisions. Further, by taxing the 
interest earnings, the same would also change at dynamic levels as well.  
1However, in the case of the RBC model, with Ricardian consumers there could be a negative impact 
on consumption. While there is a growing literature which identifies rule-of-thumb consumers, which mainly 
are Non-Ricardian and base there decisions on their current wages then the results could be standard. Similarly 
MP becomes ineffective in RBC supply side theories, but fiscal policy is affective through the investment 
demand channel and labour supply (with taxes). 
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Deficit levels, financing patterns and sources have altogether different 
implications for the macroeconomic variables. Domestic versus external borrowing, 
multilateral and others, banking versus non-banking and short-term versus long-term 
borrowing all have different dynamic affects on the economy. There has been a large of 
literature exploring these issues, for example Barro (1989) explored whether bonds are 
net wealth or not. So Ricardian Equivalence (RE) can hold or may be challenged, 
depending on the types of consumers and policy environments such as imperfect loans 
market, timing of taxes, uncertainty of incomes etc. [Barro (1989)]. 
Once the issue of fiscal stance is settled, yet another issue arises, i.e. the fiscal 
policy transmission mechanism. FP is considered to have dynamic transmission 
mechanism, as it carries longer policy lags for different macro variables. In this case (FP) 
the private agents have formed anticipations about the fiscal policy; hence it is not 
unexpected [Blanchard and Perotti (2002)].  Further, with interaction to different 
monetary policy stances considering its solvency constraint, it has different impacts on 
key macro variables. In a standard case MP can react to inflation and FP could to output 
and distribution. However MP stabilisation policies have often fallen short of results as 
earlier inflation biased policies, i.e. targeting  potential output (
*
Y ) above the natural (Y ) 
rate were adopted.2  Especially in developing economies case, where private sector lacks 
the capacity to keep output at the potential level and provide for all welfare maximising 
goods through market mechanism.3  Further new evidence show that fiscal stance can 
also impact the prices in an economy [e.g. see Leeper (1991) and Woodford (2001)]. 
Hence FP can affect the economy dynamically with different theoretical 
assumptions about the structure of the economy differently. It can have direct or indirect 
effects on levels and growth rates of demand and supply side variables such as output, 
prices, exchange rate, interest rate, balance of payment, debt, consumption, investment, 
labour supply and its (FP) own future variables.  
Once the transmission mechanism is identified then we can look for the optimal 
reaction functions of the FP for policy consistency. As policy makers have a certain loss 
function (assigned to them by society, or in a public choice model the voters loss function 
which is dictated to the policy maker in a public-agent model setting, which is to be 
minimised with certain constraints). So there could be certain short-run (output gap, 
inflation etc) objectives and long-run goals such as debt sustainability. The constraints for 
a fiscal policy reaction function (FPRF) would be the debt sustainability and stance of 
MP. The parameter stability and symmetry in response (automatic stabilisers) for these 
FPRF in the presence of business cycles, solvency conditions, debt financing patterns, FP 
institutional regimes, society’s objectives and political regimes could be different in a 
developed and a developing economy.4 Further the issue of spend-tax or tax-spend, debt 
to tax-revenue capacity and the inter-temporal budget constraint consideration i.e. the 
causality debate for long-run fiscal sustainability is yet inconclusive for developing 
economies.   
2However now most studies take Y  to be equal to 
*
Y . 
3As also seen by some empirical studies that private investments are complementary to the government 
durable spending. 
4In developing economies, going beyond the objective functions of the society it can also be used to 
bridge the two gaps of saving investment and current account balance. 
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In the context of developing economies, such as Pakistan, it becomes more crucial 
to ascertain the fiscal transmission mechanism, where active fiscal policy is practiced and 
large seigniorage revenues exist. In this context, the present study aims at estimating 
fiscal policy reaction function and identifying a fiscal policy transmission mechanism. 
More specifically, Vector Autoregression (VAR) model containing three variables, 
output gap and inflation as policy objectives and fiscal deficit as percentage of GDP as 
fiscal instrument, has been estimated. One of the three equations specifies fiscal policy 
reaction function in which fiscal policy responds to state of the economy. While the other 
two equations represent the transmission mechanism of policy.  
We find evidence of fiscal policy in Pakistan being endogenous over the period 
1965 to 2006. Though the response to both of the variables is significant, we find only 
pro-cyclical response of fiscal policy to the business cycle fluctuations. Also the pro-
cyclical response is seen more in the periods of boom. On the other hand, we could not 
identify transmission mechanism of fiscal policy with the help of model we have 
estimated. We also find the evidence of contemporaneous response of policy to state of 
the economy but the policy is not forward-looking at all.  
Rest of the study proceeds as follows. Section 2 deals with the estimation 
methodology. It provides details regarding estimating fiscal policy response function and 
transmission mechanism with the help of VAR and estimating fiscal reaction function 
with contemporaneous variables by Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). Detailed 
estimation results of fiscal reaction function and transmission mechanism are given in 
Section 3. Finally Section 4 concludes the paper.  
2.  ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
We have used three equation Vector Autoregression (VAR) technique to 
estimate state-contingent fiscal reaction function as well as the effect of fiscal policy 
changes on economic indicators—output gap and inflation.5 To find the direction of 
effect of different shocks on the three variables. Further impulse response functions 
have also been estimated. To overcome the issue of over parameterisation in the 
VAR, a near-VAR model could be used. The paper also focuses on the response of 
fiscal authority to changes in economic indicators over the business cycle, as the 
government may react differently in recessions and booms. To deal with the fact that 
standard reduced form VAR contains only lagged values of all variables as 
regressors, fiscal reaction function with contemporaneous variables could be used. 
But in this case the problem arises that information on contemporaneous variables 
may not be available to policy maker at the time of decision. The problem could be 
solved by estimating the model by instrumental variables technique, where past 
information set could be used as instruments. Detailed discussion regarding 
estimation techniques is given below.  
Consider the following three variables structural VAR, 
p
i tit
i
t XCBBX 10 … … … … (1)  
5We have used VAR technique following Malik (2006). That study specifies VAR representation of 
Pakistan’s economy to identify transmission mechanism of monetary policy. 
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Where Xt is a vector given by, 
][ tttt FDypX
 
Where FDt is real fiscal deficit as percentage of real GDP, yt is real GDP gap and pt is 
annualised inflation calculated by GDP deflator. B is a matrix of coefficients with one on 
the diagonal and off diagonal terms captures the contemporaneous effects of variables on 
each other. B0 is a vector of constant terms. Ci are the matrices of coefficients measuring 
the lagged effects of variables on each other.  t is a vector of error terms that contains 
zero mean, constant variance and serially as well as cross uncorrelated innovations, i.e. 
these elements represent pure structural shocks. Equation 1 can be converted into 
standard reduced form VAR with only lagged variables on the right hand side. 
p
i titit eXAAX 10    … … … … … (2) 
   Where, 0
1
0 BBA
                                       
i
i CBA
1
                               and tt Be
1 
Here et contains the elements that have zero mean, constant variance and are serially 
uncorrelated. However, these errors might be contemporaneously correlated, i.e. 
0jteE , 
2
jjteVar , 
0, 1jtjt eeCov , 
but Cov (ejt, ekt) may or may not be equal to zero. 
Now the problem is to estimate Equation 2 and then using these estimated 
parameters identify the structural parameters and to recover structural shocks from 
Equation 1 by imposing appropriate restrictions on structural parameters. Equation 2 can 
be estimated by OLS because right hand side variables of all equations are same. 
However if we allow different lag length in different equations then the system has to be 
estimated as seemingly unrelated (SUR) model, [Enders (2004)]. To identify the shocks a 
reasonable assumption is that fiscal authority responds the shocks in the economy only 
with one period lag but fiscal policy changes contemporaneously affect output gap that 
further affect inflation with a one period lag.6  The appropriate number of restrictions to 
make model exactly identified is
2
2
nn
, where n is the number of variables in the 
VAR, [Enders (2004)]. Here the fiscal policy shocks are estimated residuals from the first 
equation in the system of Equations 1.  
6This assumption is opposite to what is taken by Bernanke and Blinder (1992); Bernanke and Mihov 
(1998); Giannoni and Woodford (2003); Christiano, et al. (2001) among others. However the assumption taken 
in these studies is taken for monetary policy. 
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It is note worthy that VAR model deals with estimating fiscal reaction function 
only with lagged variables as economic indicators. But this may not be the case, however 
in reality. Fiscal authority may respond to contemporaneous values of economic 
indicators, provided that, the authority has the information on the state of the economy 
without any lag. If this is not the case, the reaction function could be estimated by GMM, 
i.e. an instrumental variable technique. Now, the fiscal reaction function with 
contemporaneous variables can be written as 
ttt InfGapFD
 
… … … … … … (3)        
This can be written as an orthoganality condition;  
0])[( 1tttt ZInfGapFD  … … … … … (4) 
Where Zt–1 contains information set available to the policy maker at time period t. The 
above orthogonality condition provides the basis for estimating reaction function with 
GMM.  
3.  DATA AND ESTIMATION RESULTS 
We have estimated a fiscal reaction function and fiscal transmission mechanism 
for Pakistan over the period 1965–2006. All the data are taken from International 
Financial Statistics of International Monetary Fund. Output gap has been estimated as 
percentage deviation of real GDP from its quadratic trend values.7 Three different 
instruments of fiscal policy; government expenditure, government revenues and fiscal 
deficit, are taken, in real terms, as percentage of real GDP. Where as the inflation is taken 
as growth rate of GDP deflator. 
To model the three variables, VAR in levels has been used. OLS gives efficient 
parameter estimates as long as the right hand side variables are same in all equations. At 
the same time over parameterisation in VAR can be avoided by allowing different lags in 
different equations. But in that case the so called Near-VAR is estimated as a SUR 
model. In the present study we have focused on estimating the transmission mechanism 
by VAR. however to get efficient results in a model without over parameterisation, the 
Near-VAR technique has also been used, in which only significant lagged variables are 
included. 
We start with estimating fiscal reaction function and fiscal transmission 
mechanism, using the Fiscal deficit as the fiscal policy instrument. The lags in the VAR 
are selected on the basis of Akaike Information Criteria as well as the LM test for serial 
correlation. Two lags were found to be appropriate on both these criteria. There are some 
strong conclusions coming out from these results. The results are given in Table 1 and 
Figure 1.  
First the Fiscal policy stance taken from the fiscal deficit perspective is not 
exogenous. Our results show that the policy changes can be predicted by economic 
indicators, here output gap and inflation.   
7Estimating output gap as percentage deviation from the quadratic trend for Pakistan is consistent with 
Malik (2006). 
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Secondly the results in table below show pro-cyclical response of Fiscal authority 
to the state of the economy. Both output gap and inflation predict positive changes in 
fiscal deficit in one period ahead. This shows that in setting the Fiscal Deficit as a fiscal 
policy instrument the fiscal authority is taking leverage from the fiscal space generated 
by the boom of the economy. But this is only for one period and does not take into 
account further lags.  
Table 1 
Relationship between Fiscal Deficit, Output Gap, and Inflation  
Fiscal Deficit Output Gap Inflation 
Fiscal Deficit (–1) 0.336 0.115 0.032 
 
[ 2.009] [ 0.342] [ 0.052] 
Fiscal Deficit (–2) 0.105 –0.106 –0.055  
[ 0.673] [–0.336] [–0.094] 
Output Gap (–1) 0.157 1.079 0.0672  
[ 1.889] [ 6.427] [ 0.215] 
Output Gap (–2) –0.097 –0.224 –0.227  
[–1.241] [–1.417] [–0.775] 
Inflation (–1) 0.0898 0.101 0.626  
[ 1.936] [ 1.078] [ 3.607] 
Inflation (–2) 0.062 –0.162 –0.135  
[ 1.184] [–1.530] [–0.689] 
Constant 1.827 0.346 4.526  
[ 1.923] [ 0.181] [ 1.272] 
Adjusted R-square 0.425 0.781 0.270 
Inside the parentheses are t-values 
Thirdly the pro-cyclical response of fiscal policy shows that on average the 
stabilisation objective is not considered while conducting the policy. Therefore the 
automatic-stabilisation role of the fiscal instruments does not seem to hold for Pakistan. 
This defies the Keynesian stance of fiscal policy where Fiscal authority would expand in 
those time when private agents are not willing to invest (Liquidity Trap) and government 
being a non-profit oriented entity would increase its expenditures. As interest rate 
channel does not work in Liquidity Trap hence monetary policy is ineffective, and 
increased government expenditure could positively affect the Aggregate demand, thereby 
pull the economy out of recession.  
Fourthly there seems to be a policy coordination problem between Monetary and 
Fiscal authorities. As claimed by the recent monetary policy statement by Central Bank 
[State Bank of Pakistan (2008)] that due to increasing and persistent inflation the 
monetary authority would focus on the inflation targeting only, leaving aside the output 
targeting.8  So without clear cut objectives of stabilisation with Fiscal authorities and over 
borrowing to meet pro-cyclical fiscal expansion would directly affect the inflation and  
8
“Widening of fiscal and external current account imbalances beyond targeted levels reflect high 
demand pressures in the economy, and are aggravating pressure on already high inflation. In the backdrop of 
domestic political noise and global developments, it seems unlikely that these deficits and their financing 
requirements will come close to the targets set at the beginning of current fiscal year.” Monetary policy 
statement for January-June 2008. 
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thereby monetary authority has to take contractionary stance for keeping inflation at 
limits.9  Which would increase the cost of doing business and thus create uncertainty for 
private investors in the economy.  
Fig. 1. Response of Fiscal Policy to Shocks 
Response of FIscal Policy to +- one Standard Deviation  
shock in Fiscal Policy
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9
“The main message that emerges from all this discussion is: risks to inflation outweigh the risks to 
growth in the near future. To address these risks and confront the emerging challenges, the SBP has decided to 
tighten its monetary policy further.”  Monetary policy statement for January-June 2008. 
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Impact of inertia for Fiscal policy is only for one period, however for shocks in 
output gap and inflation have long lasting effects on the fiscal deficit. Fiscal deficit 
responds to output gap shocks after one period and reaches the peak in the same and dies 
out to zero after 4th year. Response to inflation shock is the same except that it reaches 
the peak in 2nd year and dies out after five years. 
Second and third column of Table 1 shows the transmission mechanism for fiscal 
policy. Our results show that there is no significant impact of fiscal policy changes on the 
economy. As coefficients of fiscal deficit are insignificant in both the equations of output 
gap and inflation. This raises two potential issues; one policy is ineffective in changing 
the state of the economy, this could be attributed to the policy non-coordination 
(monetary policy is offsetting the possible impacts of fiscal expansion on out put and 
inflation thereby raising the interest rates). Secondly this simple model might be 
incapable of capturing the true dynamics of output gap and inflation observed in the data 
and we need to specify an elaborate model for identifying the fiscal transmission 
mechanism. So before concluding one has to see the intermediate channels for different 
macro variables such as consumption, investment, interest rates, reserve money, modes of 
debt financing etc. For instance debt financing from the banking channel might crowd out 
private investment through interest rate increase. But on the other hand if deficit is 
financed from central bank borrowing that would lead to reduce interest rate thereby 
boost economic activity.   
Fig. 2. Response of Output Gap and Inflation to Fiscal Shocks 
Response of Output Gap to one Standard shock in 
Budget Deficit +- one st dev
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Response of Inflation to one Standard shock in 
Budget Deficit +- one st dev
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We estimated the impulse response functions for the output gap and inflation 
with fiscal shocks. But the results were estimated with larger standard errors 
therefore these are insignificant hence fiscal policy is ineffective as described above 
as well.  
To estimate the response of the fiscal authority over the business cycle, we 
estimated the fiscal reaction function with boom and recession dummies. Our results in 
Equation 5 suggest that the pro-cyclical response is significant only in boom periods and 
the response is insignificant in recessionary periods. Then we decomposed the fiscal 
instruments in tax revenue and Government expenditures as percentage of GDP.10 
Interestingly both instruments of fiscal policy showed quite different response. Response 
of Government expenditures is the opposite as that of the fiscal deficit, i.e. fiscal 
authority does take expansionary a cyclical position in recessions but remains 
insignificant in boom periods. Contrarily the tax policy is pro-cyclical in both boom and 
recession which is quite opposite to the tax smoothing principle and automatic 
stabilisation objective of the fiscal policy.   
FD = 4.026 + 0.183 GAP (–1)*D1–0.002 GAP (–1)*D2 + 0.145 INF (–1)  …  (5)11   
   (8.607)  (2.747)                     (–0.029)                         (3.298)  
Adjusted R-Square = 0.297 S.E. of regression = 1.249 D.W. stat = 1.242  
Here FD is the real value of fiscal deficit as a percentage of real GDP, GAP is the 
output gap from potential level of output, D1 is the dummy for boom and D2 is the 
dummy for recessionary periods. Finally INF is the inflation rate measured as the growth 
rate of GDP deflator.12  
As policy has responded to lagged variables, there are two other possibilities of 
policy reactions, i.e. fiscal authority could respond to contemporaneous variables or it 
could be forward looking. Therefore we have used the GMM estimation technique and 
the results are reported in Equation 6 below.13 
FD = 3.316 + 0.151 GAP + 0.278 INF  … … … … (6) 
        (3.389)  (2.119)          (2.770) 
The fiscal policy does respond to the contemporaneous variables but it certainly 
does not have any forward looking policy setting behaviour.14  
Finally to complete our discussion, we estimated a near VAR model, in which 
different lag length is allowed indifferent equations and variables with significant effects 
are included. Estimating the system of equations as a SUR model we find the same 
results as already noted above for fiscal deficit as a fiscal policy instrument.  
10Detailed results with the other two instruments are given in Appendix Tables  3 and 4. 
11t-values are in parenthesis.  
12We have also estimated the response function with Autoregressive terms to remove the 
autocorrelation from the residual term but the results did not change significantly. 
13t-values are in parenthesis. 
14We also estimated a forward looking fiscal reaction function, but its results were not significant and 
not reported in this paper. 
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Table 2 
Results of Near VAR Model  
Fiscal Deficit Output Gap Inflation 
Fiscal Deficit (–1) 0.718   
 
[9.958]   
Fiscal Deficit (–2)        
Output Gap (–1) 0.084 1.121   
[2.228] [8.129]  
Output Gap (–2)  –0.264    
[–2.178]  
Inflation (–1) 0.164 0.113 0.909  
[3.765] [1.515] [13.358] 
Inflation (–2)  –0.131    
[–1.74]  
Adjusted R-square 0.215 0.799 0.170 
Inside the parentheses are t-values.   
Fiscal policy is found to be endogenous and pro-cyclical, where as changes in the 
policy does not affect any of the targeted variables. Inflation turns out to be exogenous in 
the system, as there might be a need to identify intermediate channels in the fiscal 
transmission mechanism.  
4.  CONCLUSION 
Structural developments in public finance leads to effect both the demand and 
supply side of the economy in a dynamic manner. Modern Macroeconomics literature 
identifies both the short-run (demand management) and long-run (supply management) 
objectives of fiscal policy [Romer (2006)]. 
We have estimated the fiscal transmission mechanism for Pakistan for three 
leading indicators of Fiscal policy i.e. the budget deficit, government expenditures 
and tax revenues. We also calculated the fiscal policy reaction functions and 
analysed for its endogenity and contemporaneous responses from other macro 
variables.  
Fiscal policy is identified to be endogenous and pro-cyclical in boom if fiscal 
deficit is taken as the fiscal instrument, but it is insignificant in recessionary phase of the 
economy. However for government expenditures, these are anti-cyclical in the 
recessionary periods but have insignificant response in booms. Where as the Tax policy is 
pro-cyclical for both boom and recessions. In our smaller macro model for fiscal policy 
analysis, we could not identify any transmission mechanism of the fiscal policy for output 
gap and inflation. Further Fiscal policy is backward looking and contemporaneous but 
not forward looking at all.  
However there is a need to see the dynamic effects of shocks in budgetary 
components to macro variable while adjusting for the discretionary and cyclical 
responses of these components for gauging the actual transmission mechanism.  
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APPENDIX  
Table 3 
Fiscal Reaction Function with Revenues as Instrument  
Dependent Variable t-values 
C 14.98170 34.14221 
GAP*D1 –0.139616 –2.144649 
GAP*D2 0.361815 4.691610 
INF_GDPD –0.058858 –1.496095 
Adjusted R-square 0.412722  
S.E. of Regression 1.124334  
 
Table 4 
Fiscal Reaction Function with Expenditures as Instrument  
Dependent Variable t-values 
C 9.803441 17.38278 
GAP*D1 –0.043591 –0.520989 
GAP*D2 0.207516 2.093614 
INF_GDPD 0.037023 0.732197 
Adjusted R-square 0.046175  
S.E. of Regression 1.445058  
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